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Remarriage and Wrongful Death: A Model for Voir
Dire Examination
Few rules have gained the degree of acceptance accorded the principle
that the fact of remarriage of a surviving spouse is inadmissible for the
purpose of mitigating damages in a wrongful death action.' The English
common law rule,2 that the fact of remarriage is admissible as a factor
influencing the determination of damages, has received little support in
American decisions.3 Furthermore, while some commentators have expressed support for a rule allowing the fact of remarriage to enter into
consideration in determining damages, 4 it is difficult to reconcile this
'The general rule that the remarriage of a surviving spouse in a wrongful death action
does not affect the damages recoverable has been adopted in at least twenty-one jurisdictions.
Furthermore, a number of jurisdictions have extended the general rule to hold that evidence of
the remarriage of the surviving spouse is not admissible where offered only for the purpose of
mitigating damages. See Annot. 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963 & Supps. 1968, 1975) (Cases dt d at §§
4,5). See generally S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 6.12 (1966).
Recent decisions have established the continuing validity of the exclusionary approach.
See, e.g., Luddy v. State, 30 App. Div. 2d 993, 294 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1968), affl'd, 25 N.Y.2d 773, 303
N.Y.S.2d 522, 250 N.E.2d 581 (1969); Stuart v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 6 Wash. App. 841,
496 P.2d 527 (1972). See also cases cited at note 27 infra.
There are two types of wrongful death statutes which allow death damages to be
recovered by a surviving spouse. Broadly classified, these are "survival statutes," which treat
the deceased as if he survived to have his own day in court, and "wrongful death" statutes,
patterned after the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vic, c.93, commonly known as
Lord Campbell's Act, which provide for a new cause of action to vest in the survivors. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 925, Comment a (1939). This note will focus upon voir dire
exafnination under statutes modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. The Indiana wrongful death
statute is an example of such a legislative enactment. See IND. CODE § 34-1-1-2 (1976).
It would appear that the same problems which arise under "wrongful death" statutes
may also arise under "survival" type legislation since the defendant may still seek to introduce
the remarriage to assure an unbiased jury, while the plaintiff will still be apprehensive about
the effect of such evidence on the jury's determination of damages. Note, however, that under
the survival statutes no serious contention can be made that the fact of remarriage should serve
to mitigate damages since the statute does not seek to Create a new cause of action in the
survivors. Cf. notes 16-17, infra, & text accompanying.
2
See Hall v. Wilson, [1939] 4 All E.R. 85, where the court stated:
Although this lady is quite firmly of the opinion and perhaps rightly of the
opinion, that she will never marry again, she is an attractive young woman who
might marry again; one cannot ignore the possibility that she may marry again, and
I take that into consideration.
Id. at 87. See also Mead v. Clarke Chapman & Co., [1956] 1 W.L.R. 76, [1956] 1 All E.R. 44
(C.A.) (allowing the possibility of remarriage to be shown as a factor mitigating damages).
The common law rule has been overruled by statutory enactment. See Law Reform Act, 1971,
c.43, § 4(1), construed in Howitt v. Heads, [1972] 2 W.L.R. 183 (Assize).
3See notes 10-13 infra & text accompanying. Nevertheless, the common law rule still
finds support in the case law of certain other nations. See, e.g., Lefebvre v. Dowdall &
McLean, [1965] 1 Ont. 1 (Canada); Willis v. Commonwealth, 73 C.L.R. 105 (1946) (Australia).
'See, e.g., Comment, Remarriage and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act: The Effect of
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approach with the most basic tenets of the collateral source rule.5 In light
of this fact some commentators have been forced to direct their criticisms at
6
the collateral source rule itself.
The exclusionary rule, or "rule of inadmissibility," is subject to
challenge from a procedural perspective as well as to challenges directed at
its substantive bases. Although designed to assure the plaintiff a proper
determination of statutory damages, application of the rule may have
undersirable tangential consequences. It has been argued that application
of the rule infringes upon the defendant's fundamental right to an
unbiased jury, to such an extent, and in such a manner, that policy
demands that the rule be either modified or discarded.7 Moreover, continued adherence to the rule raises questions concerning the integrity of the
judicial process itself.'
This note will examine the general rule of inadmissibility as it applies
to voir dire examination of prospective jurors in a wrongful death action. It
is in the context of voir dire examination that courts are often first urged to
exclude the fact of remarriage from jury consideration and, thus, first faced
with the admissibility dilemma.9 It is at this stage of the proceedings that
the interests of the parties are first crystallized. From a discussion of the
conflicting considerations involved and an examination of the alternatives
available, this note will attempt to resolve the admissibility dilemma by
suggesting a uniform procedure to be employed in wrongful death actions
where the admissibility of the fact of the plaintiff's remarriage is in dispute.
THE RULE OF INADMISSIBILITY

Among those courts which have faced the question, only those of
Changes in Status of Beneficiaries on Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAC.
&:PROC. 395, 412-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Remarriage and the Illinois Act]; Comment,
Remarriage and Wrongful Death, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 653 (1967).

5
Briefly stated, the collateral source rule provides that compensation from collateral
sources, e.g. insurance, does not diminish the damages recoverable. C. MCCORMICK, HAND-

BOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 90 (1935). See generally, 22 Am. JUR. 2d Damages § 206 (1965)

which states that "benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and
collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the
wrongdoer." See also Maxwell, The CollateralSource Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962); Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 231
(1960).
6See, e.g., Comment, Remarriage and Wrongful Death, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 653 (1967);
Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV. 741
(1964).7
See Brief for Appellant at 36-42, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490. 528 P.2d 876 (1974).
But see Brief for Appellee at 33-39. [On file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL]
8See notes 32-33, infra, & text accompanying.
9The term "voir dire" is employed generically to include pre-trial procedures in addition
to the actual examination of prospective jurors. This is made necessary by the fact that the
plaintiff will often seek to exclude the fact of remarriage via a motion in limine or a motion
for a protective order.
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Wisconsin 10 and Mississippi" have held that the remarriage of the
surviving spouse, or the possibility thereof, is admissible for the purpose of
mitigating the damages recoverable in an action for the wrongful death of
the plaintiff's deceased spouse. In addition, two other states have adopted
this rule through legislative action, 2 while one state, which previously
followed the minority rule, recently adopted the general rule of inadmissibility.13
In general, courts have offered two justifications for the rule of
inadmissibility:
(1) Since the cause of action arises at the time of death, damages are
determinable at that time and subsequent events are not to be considered by
the finder of fact in determining the damage award;1 4 and
(2) Any rule which provides for mitigation would be highly speculative and conjectural in nature as it would necessitate a comparison of the
prospective value of the earnings and services of the deceased spouse with
those of the new spouse.' 5
0jensen v. Heritage Mutual Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964).
"Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87 (Miss. 1967). In Campbell, a wrongful death action
arising out of a collision between a southbound motorist and an eastbound truck, the court
held the southbound motorist negligent as a matter of law but remanded on the damage issue'
stating:
Since this case must be retried, we feel that is is necessary to point out that the
testimony showing any change in the conditions on which the suit is based is
competent as against the rights of the person or persons affected; therefore, we hold
that testimony may be introduced to show the remarriage of the widow, after the
death of the husband, for which the suit is brought.
Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
12See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21(6)(c) (West 1975) which states that "[e]vidence of remarriage
of the decedent's spouse is admissible." See also Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4675a (Vernon
Supp. 1976) which provides:
In an action under this title evidence of the actual ceremonial remarriage of the
surviving spouse is admissible, if such is true, but the defense is prohibited from
directly or indirectly mentioning or alluding to any common-law marriage,
extramarital relationship, or marital prospects of the surviving spouse.
See also Seaboard Coastline R. R. v. Hill, 270 So. 2d 359, 361-63 (Fla. 1972) (dissenting
opinion).
13See Bunda v. Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965), overruling Jones v.
McMillan, 129 Mich. 86, 88 N.W. 206 (1901); Stuive v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 311 Mich. 143,
18 N.W.2d 404 (1945); Sipes v. Michigan C. R. Co., 231 Mich. 404, 204 N.W. 84 (1925).
14See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387, 391, 38 S.W. 1121, 1122 (1897).
Inherent in this rationale is the policy that a wrongdoer should not be relieved of the burden
of compensating his victim by the fortuity of available collateral avenues of compensation.
This."collateral source rule" is usually presented as part of the first justification presented in
the text. See, e.g., McFarland v. Illinois C.R.R., 241 La. 15, 19, 127 So. 2d 183, 186 (1961). It has
also been suggested as a separate and distinct rationale for the rule of inadmissibility. See, e.g.,
Remarriage and the Illinois Act, supra note 4, at 409. See also note 5 supra.
"See, e.g., Hardware State Bank v. Corner, 55 Ill. 2d 240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973); Smith v.

Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972).
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These justifications for the majority rule have been set forth in the oft
cited case of The City of Rome1 6 where the court reasoned:
If we should enter upon an inquiry as to the relative merits of the new
husband as a provider, coupled with his age, employment, condition of
health, and other incidental elements concerning him, unavoidably we
should embark upon a realm of speculation and be led into a sea of
impossible calculations. Moreover, adherence to the rule followed by the
commissioner seems essential to consistency with the holding that, upon
the death of the first husband, there was "an immediate, final and absolute
vesting" in his17 widow, if the statutory beneficiary, of a cause of action on
that account.
Despite the apparent force of these arguments a number of cases have
recognized exceptions to the general rule.18 One court has summarized the
exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility which have evolved as follows:
Plaintiff further maintains, and correctly so, that in several of the cases
from other jurisdictions cited by the trial court in its findings denying
plaintiff's motion for a protective order on the question of remarriage,
evidence of remarriage by a surviving spouse has been admitted only where
the circumstances differed greatly from those presented in this case. In the
cases cited, such evidence was allowed (1) when coupled with evidence of
previous marital difficulties in an action for loss of consortium, (2) for
purposes of impeachment, where _the question of remarriage was not
objected to when the spouse answered in the negative when asked if she had
remarried, and (3) where both marital misconduct and subsequent remarriage by a surviving spouse were involved. 9
In Jensen v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co.20 the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin examined the exclusionary rule and rejected its most basic
premise - that the finder of fact may only consider those facts which
existed at the time of death of the plaintiff's decedent. As to the relevancy of
the plaintiff's remarriage the court stated:
1648 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (claim under the Death on the High Seas Act).

17d. at 343. See Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1967). But see

Appellant's Brief at 38-39, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974) [on file at the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
8

' 1See, e.g., Rayner v. Ramirez, 159 Cal. App. 2d 372, 383, 324 P.2d 83, 91 (1958) (where the

question of remarriage was not objected to and the widow testified she had not remarried, an
authenticated copy of the marriage license was admitted over objection "at least for the
purpose of impeachment, and did have some bearing on the question of loss of comfort,
society and support .. "); McGuire v. East Ky. Beverage Co., 238 S.W.2d 1020, 1022 (Ky. App.
1951) (remarriage "incompetent for any purpose" in wrongful death action, but admissible in
husband's suit for loss of consortium). Cf. Wood v. Alves Serv. Trans. Inc., 191 Cal. App. 2d

723, 13 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1961) (defense attorney's reference to probability of remarriage in
opening statement did not constitute prejudicial error when made in good faith).
19Thompson v. Peters, 26 Mich. App. 590, 182 N.W.2d 763, 766 (1970), rev'd 386 Mich. 532,
194 N.W.2d 301 (1972) (reversed on the basis that the jury never reached the issue of damages

in its deliberations and so was not influenced by the disclosure of the fact of remarriage).
2023 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964). See note 10 supra.
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Defendant stresses the early remarriage of the plaintiff wife. The possibility of marriage or remarriage is always an element which it is proper for
the jury to consider in determining damages in a wrongful death
action.... This being so, [it] necessarily follows that where the possibility
has become an actuality by time of trial the jury should be permitted to
consider such fact in assessing damages. We are not impressed with the
rationale . . . that a jury, in fixing damages for wrongful death, must
consider only the facts that exist at date of death, and may not take into
21
account a remarriage before trial.

Support for this view has been found in statutes analogous to Lord
Campbell's Act and in the very history and wording of the act itself.22
The majority rule has been subject to criticism from academic
commentators, as well as from members of the bench and bar. 23 A recent
article by two trial lawyers presents the most scathing attack on the
inadmissibility rule.2 4 The authors noted:
The refusal of most courts to admit evidence of remarriage in cases where
mitigation or an absence of monetary loss can be shown by the defendant
is but a small part of the eclipse of reason. The fundamental misfeasance
of the Collateral Source Rule is that it promotes and legalizes "bigamy" in
the courtroom. The remarried spouse is allowed to reap the benefits of the
monetary value of the lives of two wives, one technically alive in terms of
her replacement value, the other actually alive and rendering the services
25
of a wife.
21

id. at 355, 127 N.W.2d at 234 (citations omitted). But see text accompanying note 17
supra.
22
Lord Campbell's Act, as it is popularly known, was enacted as the Fatal Accidents Act,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c.93. For a view of statutes analogous to Lord Campbell's Act see generally,
2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs', THE LAw OF Tois § 24.2 at 1285-88 (1956). See also Comment,
Remarriageand Wrongful Death, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 653 (1967), in which the writer challenges
the validity of the majority rule which does not allow the jury to consider remarriage as an
element in determining damages and concludes that statutory construction leads inescapably to
the conclusion that death damages should be mitigated. Id. at 657. The writer argues that the
history of the act itself supports this conclusion:
The .purpose of this statute was to provide the decedent's dependents with a
sufficient monetary award against the person Whose negligent or wrongful acts
caused the decedent's death in order to enable them to subsist without becoming
wards of society. It is quite apparent that it was not within the reason of this statute
to provide the dependents with an award so that they could live more prosperous
lives than they would have had the decedent lived.
Id. at 658. Finally, the writer finds support by analogy in workmen's compensation legislation.
which often provides that the marital status of the surviving spouse has an effect on the death,
benefits allowable. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(8)(I) (1957).
23
See, e.g., Remarriage and the Illinois Act, supra note 4, at 408-15; note 22 supra.
It has even been contended that to allow a jury to consider one change of status (death)
in mitigation but not to consider others (e.g. marriage) "is arbitrary and violative of due
process and equal protection." Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill.
2d 240, 248, 3(62 N.E.2d
257, 263 (1973). The Supreme Court of Illinois easily disposed of this argument. Id. at 249, 302
N.E.2d at 263. See generally Remarriage and the Illinois Act, supra note 4, at 399-401.
24
Shields and Giles, Remarriage and the CollateralSource Rule, 36 INs. CouNs. J. 354
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Remarriage and the Collateral Source Rule].
2Id. at 354.
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The basic inconsistencies of the collateral source rule are not easily

dismissed. While the jury is told to consider the probable length of life of
the deceased and the services he or she would have rendered, they are forced,
by lack of information, to ignore the fact that a new spouse has replaced
the deceased and that this new spouse may provide care, comfort and
ser, ices even in excess of those which the deceased spouse could have been

expected to provide. Moreover, while the law permits intangible factors
such as loss of companionship, comfort and guidance to be translated into
pecuniary terms for the purpose of calculating recovery they are removed
26
from the jury's consideration for the purpose of determining mitigation.
Despite the force of these criticisms it is now apparent that an ever

increasing number of courts are finding the logic of the majority rule to be
persuasive.2 7 This trend is perhaps best exemplified by the recent decision
26

See id. at 357-58 where the authors point to Davis v. Guarneri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E.
350 (1887), as illustrative of the problem. In Davis, the authors report, counsel for the
defendant asked:
If it be true that it was proper for the jury to take into account the probable length
of life of the deceased wife, and the services she would probably render, was it not
also proper to consider that another woman occupied the same relation towards the
husband and children, rendered the same services, and in the accumulation of
property, and became to them precisely what the deceased woman would have been
had she lived? ... Can it be that he could recover for years of loss of these services by
reason of the death.., when during the same years the same pecuniary services were
being rendered him by another woman? Suppose the first woman had been an
unsuitable person to rear his children, negligent in the discharge of her duties to
him and to them, which as a wife and mother she should have done, and upon her
death another woman came into the same relations with him and his children but
rendered valuable services to both, shall it be said that his loss cannot be mitigated
by proof of such a state of facts? Should not the jury have been put in possession of
all facts surrounding this husband and these children during the years that followed
the death of the wife and mother, so that they could have better determined what the
real pecuniary loss to both was?
Remarriage and the CollateralSource Rule, supra note 24, at 357. The authors continue by
declaring that
[t]he court's only reply to this eloquent statement was that 'while this reasoning was
not without plausibility it was wholly unsupported by adjudication.' The defendant
had pointed out, to the court's chagrin, that the remarried spouse had been allowed
to translate into pecuniary terms, dollars and cents, the so-called intangibles for the
purposes of recovery that the defendant was told were beyond evaluation and
measurement for purposes of mitigation. No precedents could be found because
courts generally have not been willing to face up to the inescapable logic of the very
doctrine, compensation for actual pecuniary loss, that was espoused but irrationally
rejected.
Id. at 357-58. In Indiana the measure of damages is not restricted to pecuniary damages but
includes allowance for loss of companionship, comfort and guidance. See, e.g., New York
Cent. R.R. v. Wyatt, 135 Ind. App. 205, 184 N.E.2d 657 (1962); American Carloading Corp. v.
Gary Trust & Say. Bank Admr., 216 Ind. App. 642, 25 N.E.2d 777 (1940).
27
During the past twenty years alone nineteen jurisdictions have adopted or reaffirmed
the majority view that evidence of remarriage may not be employed to mitigate damages or
that such evidence, is not admissible if offered only for the purpose of mitigation. These

1976]

REMARRIAGE AND WRONGFUL DEATH

287

of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Bunda v. HardwickU overturning
nearly seventy years of judicial decisions and adopting the majority rule.
ADMISSIBILITY ON VOIR DIRE

A classic extension of the rule that evidence of remarriage, or the
possibility thereof, is inadmissible for the purpose of mitigating damages,
holds that such evidence is inadmissible for any purpose in a wrongful
death action. This is apparently the express command of a number of
29
earlier cases and the implied logic of at least one quite recent decision.
When the subject of analysis turns from the actual trial of a wrongful
death action to the conduct of proper voir dire examination of prospective
jurors, those factors which arguably militate against the extension of the
exclusionary rule to this aspect of the litigation become evident.3 0 These
considerations may be summarized as follows:
First, disclosure of the remarriage of the plaintiff is necessary to the
selection of an unbiased jury. It is quite conceivable that the prospective
juror is only familiar with the plaintiff, or with the plaintiff's past
activities or reputation, through the newly acquired surname. Thus, failure
to disclose this new name to the jury allows for the possibility of
jurisdictions include: Ariz., Cal., Del., Fal., Ga., Ill., Ind., La., Md., Mich., Mo., N.J., N.Y.,
Pa., R.I., S.C., Tenn., Tex., and Wash. See, e.g., Bell Aerospace Corp. v. Anderson, 478 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972); Phelps v.
Magnavox Co., 497 S.W.2d 898 (Tenn. App. 1972); .Wright v. Dilbeck, 22 Ga. App.
214, 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970); Central Ind. Ry. v. Anderson Banking Co., 143 Ind. App. 396, 240
N.E.2d 840 (1968); Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1967);
Curnow v. West View Park Co., 220 F. Supp. 367 (D.C. Pa. 1963). Of these, ten jurisdictions
have permitted such evidence, in some form, to be admitted on voir dire. See State v. Cress, 22
Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974); Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill.2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973);
Rodak v. Fury, 31 App. Div. 2d 816, 298 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1969); Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595,
261 A.2d 889 (1970); Cherrigan v. City and County of San Francisco, 262 Cal. App. 2d 643, 69
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968); Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 245 A.2d 177 (1968); Glick v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 435 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1968); Helmick v. Netzley, 40 Ohio, Op. 2d 104, 229 N.E.2d 476
(C.P., Montgomery County 1967) and FLA.STAT. ANN. § 768.21(6)(c) (West Supp. 1975); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4675a (Vernon Supp. 1976).
Indiana is among the jurisdictions which endorse the rule that remarriage should not.be
considered in determining the measure of damages for the death of the decedent. See, e.g.,
Central Ind. Ry. v. Anderson Banking Co., 143 Ind. App. '396, 240 N.E.2d 840 (1968);
Evansville &Ohio Valley Ry. v. Woosley, 120 Ind. App. 570, 93 N.E.2d 355 (1950); Wabash Ry.
v. Gretzinger, 182 Ind. 155, 104 N.E. 69 (1914); Consolidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind.
241, 66 N.E. 696 (1903).
28376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965). See note 13 supra.
29
See, e.g., Evansville & Ohio Valley Ry. v. Woosley, 120 Ind. App. 570, 93 N.E.2d 355
(1950) (not material to any of the issues); McGuire v. East Ky. Beverage Co., 238 S.W.2d 1020
(Ky. 1951) ("incompetent for any purpose"). The recent decision in State v. Cress, 22 Ariz.
App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974), can be defended on the grounds that prior decisions, dealing
only with the issue of admissibility on the question of damages, impliedy determined that
evidence of remarriage is inadmissible for any purpose and thus may not be employed on voir
dire. For a fuller discussion of Cress and its predecessors, see notes 46-52, infra, & text
accompanying.
S3In adopting the limited availability mode see text accompanying notes 41-52 infia, the
court in Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d 889 (1970) stated-
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subsequent juror recognition of the plaintiff. Obviously the thrust of such
a contention is directed to those instances in which the plaintiff is a female
who has adopted the surname of her new spouse. 31 However, it is not
difficult to postulate a case in which an empaneled juror realizes, at some
intermediate point in the presentation of evidence, that he knows, or has
had dealings with, the plaintiff's new wife but never connected the
identical surnames during voir dire. In such a case it is the fact of
remarriage which, when disclosed to the jury, will go far toward assuring
an unbiased panel.
Second, the integrity of the judicial process itself is arguably at stake. It
has been argued that adherence to the rule prohibiting evidence of remarriage
perpetrates a fraud upon the jury by requiring the female plaintiff to use
the surname of her first marriage, rather than the name she presently
employs, throughout the litigation.3 2 After taking an oath to tell the truth,
the witness' first response, i.e. her name, will be a court sanctioned
misrepresentation. It would appear that "[n]o meritorious goal is served by

The argument against an exclusionary rule can be summarized as follows:
1. The integrity of the judicial process requires that plaintiff's true name and
remarriage be made known to the jury.
2. Such knowledge by the jury is essential for an adequate voir dire examination of
prospective jurors.
3. Any risk of prejudice to the plaintiff is negated by proper instructions stating
that the remarriage should have no part in their deliberations as to the amount of
damages.
4. It must be assumed that a jury will follow the instructions of the court.
An exclusionary rule, however, would preclude any reference to or evidence of
remarriage and by so doing avoid the danger that evidence of remarriage or the
possibility thereof, irrelevant to the amount of damages recoverable, might unduly
prejudice the jury, in arriving at the amount of damages, against the surviving
spouse. Such a rule impliedly rejects the efficacy of a limiting instruction in such a
case.
Id. at1 601-02, 261 A.2d at 893.
S For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that the plaintiff is female and has
remarried since the allegedly wrongful death of her first husband and has adopted the
surname of her second marriage. Perhaps at this point the reader will find it to his benefit to
refer to the facts of a "model" wrongful death action. For this purpose see the cautionary
instruction in the text accompanying note 60 infra.
32
See Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 503, 301 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1973); Dubil v. Labate,
52 N.J. 255, 261-62, 245 A.2d 177, 180 (1968). In Watson the court dismissed the "limited
availability model," concluding:
There is, to us, a patent offensiveness in a rule which countenances false statements
made under oath in a judicial proceeding on the theory that, unless false testimony
is permitted, jurors will disregard the instructions of the court to the prejudice of
the plaintiff.
We believe the judicial process in its search for truth need not resort to the
condonation of perjury to accomplish its objective, and we accordingly hold that
prospective jurors may be told by the judge that a plaintiff has remarried.
54 Ill. 2d at 503, 301 N.E.2d at 306.
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resorting to half-truths and falsehoods in order to supposedly render
33
plaintiff her just reward."
Other factors must also be considered in evaluating the applicability of
the exclusionary rule to voir dire. For example, proponents of the
exlusionary aproach are likely to contend that even a limited exposure,
perhaps tempered by an appropriate instruction, to the fact of remarriage
on voir dire is likely to prejudice the jury in its ultimate determination of
liability and damages. Such a contention exhibits two basic failings. First,
it assumes that a jury is incapable, or unwilling, to follow instructions on
the proper procedure for determining liability or the measure of damages.
In addition, it ignores the reality that a number of factors inherent in any
case tend to "prejudice" a jury. It is arguable that if potential prejudice of
jury deliberations is the true basis of the exclusionary rule, there is little
justification for even permitting the jury to learn the sex of the plaintiff. A
defense attorney might argue that, in determining damages, a jury is likely
to be more sympathetic to a female plaintiff than to a similarly situated
male.

34

Finally, the proponents of admissibility for a limited purpose on voir
dire have argued that the exclusionary rule cannot be equated to the
collateral source rule since that rule does not require resort to misrepresentation. Furthermore, it is argued that the the risk of prejudice in the
"limited purpose" rule may be negated by a properly framed jury
instruction.3 5 It is against these contentions that the arguments in favor of
exclusion must be weighed and, it should be noted, that a growing number
of courts which have faced the issue have determined that introduction of
evidence establishing the remarriage of the plaintiff, or implementation of
an alternative procedure designed to minimize potential jury prejudice, is a
proper aspect of voir dire examination. Attention can now be directed to
applying these observations to procedures which have been proposed.
ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES

There is no unanimity among the courts which have considered the
appropriate procedure for introducing the remarriage of a surviving spouse
33

the

Brief for Appellant at.40, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974) [on file at

INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL].
4

Of course, the same logic can be extended to hide race, religion or even physical
appearance from the jury. If the true aim of exclusion is to prevent jury prejudice because the
jury will be less sympathetic to a remarried plaintiff, it is difficult to explain why this factor is
kept from the jury while a virtual barrage of potentially prejudicial characteristics is made
available for jury consideration. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
193-218 (1966), dealing with jury sympathy for criminal defendants. See also id. at 211, Table
65 which illustrates that the "sympathy index" is greater for females than males, for whites
than 5non-whites and for the young as compared to the middle aged and the elderly.
3 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 41-42, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876
(1974) [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNALl.
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to the jury in the context of a voir dire examination.3 6 While countless
alternative procedures may be suggested for permitting the prospective
jurors to be informed of the plaintiff's remarriage, only two proposals have
received significant recognition and these may be employed as analytical
models. The first, or limited availability model, is based on the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Wiesel v. Cicerone"7 and
has most recently found acceptance in the decision of the Arizona Court of
Appeals in State v. Cress.38 The second model, employing a cautionary
instruction, parallels the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Dubil v. Labate 9 and the Supreme Court of Illinois in Watson v.
40
Fischbach.
3
6See generally the discussion in Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303
(1973). Compare Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d 889 (1970) and text accompanying
notes 41-52 infra, with Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 245 A.2d 177 (1968) and text
accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
37106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d 889 (1970).
3822 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974).
3152 N.J. 255, 245 A.2d 177 (1968). See also Glick v. Allstate Ins. Co,, 435 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.
App. 1968), involving a proceeding on a petition for declaratory judgment to determine
whether, in the trial of a death action, the defense would be permitted to disclose the fact of
remarriage of one of the plaintiffs. The circuit court dismissed the petition and the appellate
court affirmed that decision. In strongly worded dicta the court adopted the view set forth in
Dubil and quoted extensively from that opinion. The court concluded:

Even if the trial court had not dismissed the plaintiff's petition, but instead had
assumed jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment laying down "guidelines" for
trial of the death actions, the court could not properly have granted plaintiffs the
relief they had prayed for. Clearly it would have been error for the court to have
declared that knowledge of the widow's remarriage should be withheld from the
jury in the trial of such actions. In our opinion such procedure would not be
consistent with the high standards of integrity which the judicial process should
maintain.
435 S.W.2d at 22-23.
4054 II. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973). See also Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill. 2d
240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973); Mulvey v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356
(1972), aff'd, 53 Ill. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973); Kissell, Sympathy in Wrongful Death
Litigation, 58 ILL. B.J. 442 (1970).
In Watson the court noted that the propriety of reference to the remarriage of the
surviving spouse must be examined in terms of its relevancy to the selection of a fair and
impartial jury as well as in the traditional terms of relevancy in the determination of damages.
54 Ill. 2d at 500-01, 301 N.E.2d at 304-05. In permitting defendant's counsel to mention the
remarriage on voir dire, the court stated:
We are not persuaded that jurors will so far abdicate their responsibilities as to
consider a remarriage in determining liability, assuming a properly restrictive and
cautionary instruction has been requested and given [citations omitted]. And the
possibility that the amount of damages awarded may be affected by knowledge of
the fact that plaintiff has remarried, if it exists, must be weighed against what seems
to us an element essential to the integrity of the jury trial process: that the parties to
the litigation have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the fact-finding body
is free from influence-producing relationships unfavorable to them.
54 Ill. 2d at 501, 301 N.E.2d at 305. But see Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595, 607, 261 A.2d 889,
896 (1970).
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The Limited Availability Model

The basis of the "limited" model of admissibility is the view that a

cautionary instruction informing the prospective jurors that the fact of
remarriage is not to be considered in determining damages would not
outweigh the likelihood of misuse of that information by the jury. 41 This
view has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island as well as by
4
the trial and appellate courts of Arizona, California, New York and Ohio. 2
Under this restrictive procedure no actual disclosure of the fact of

remarriage is permitted. That fact is only available to the defendant on voir
dire in the sense that he may introduce the new spouse, by name or in

person, to the jury for the limited purpose of uncovering any potentially
prejudicial acquaintance, but he is prohibited from disclosing the remarriage itself. Any comment indicating that the plaintiff has remarried would

seem to constitute reversible error in the case where the jurors who heard
the disclosure were empaneled, and an ethical impropriety even where the
jury was dismissed and a new group of prospective jurors selected. 43 Such a
41
In rejecting the cautionary instruction model, see text accompanying notes 53-56 infra,
the court in Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d 889 (1970) held:

To inject information concerning a widow's remarriage would, in our
judgment, not only introduce irrelevant matter, but what is more important, it
would be admitting evidence which could very well have a tendency to confuse the
jury and adversely prejudice the plaintiff. This would in our opinion be putting a
premium on form and overlooking substance. Nor do we believe that an instruction
to the jury at the inception of the trial, or during the trial, saying that evidence of
remarriage is not to be considered by them will outweigh likelihood of misuse of
such evidence by the jury [citation omitted]. For the same reason, neither do we
believe that the presumption that the jury will follow the trial judge's instructions
will outweigh the likelihood of misuse of such evidence.
Id. at 606-07, 261 A.2d at 895.
One writer has suggested that a rule allowing disclosure on voir dire, because the jury is
presumed capable of following a cautionary instruction, is based on a "dubious premise."
and the Illinois Act, supra note 4, at 315.
Remarriage
42
See, e.g., State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974); Rodak v. Fury, 31 App.
Div. 2d 816, 298 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1969); Cherrigan v. City and County of San Francisco, 262 Cal.
App. 2d 643, 69 Cap. Rptr. 42 (1968); Helmick v. Netzley, 40 Ohio Op. 2d 104, 229 N.E.2d 476
(1967).43
See, e.g., Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 245 A.2d 177 (1968), where the court concluded:
It would be offensive to the integrity of the judicial process if the plaintiff, after
taking an oath to be truthful, were permitted to misrepresent her marital status to
the jury. Of course, the defendants may not inquire into the details of the remarriage
nor may they offer evidence concerning it. However, the desirable exclusion of
evidence relating to the remarriage may not be carried to the point of affirmatively
misrepresenting the truth to the jury.
Id. at 261-62, 245 A.2d at 180 (quoted with approval in Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498,
501.02, 301 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1973), where the court also noted that "[b]eyond the voir dire,
questions comments or arguments relating to the remarriage will, ordinarily, be improper."
54 Ill.
2d at 503, 301 N.E.2d at 306).
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view of the attorney's improper behavior accords with the principles pre44
viously developed under the collateral source rule.
Under this model the defendant is protected from biased or partial
jurors by permitting voir dire examination of prospective jurors regarding

their acquaintance with the new spouse, while not permitting the
disclosure of the relationship of that person to the plaintiff. The limited
availability model also provides that witnesses related to the new spouse

could be presented in a similar fashion to the prospective jurors, or
properly framed questions might be posed to those persons concerning

their backgrounds or businesses, in order to determine whether the

prospective jurors are in any way acquainted with them. 4 Nevertheless, it
is well accepted that under this model disclosure of the fact of remarriage is
not permitted.
The utility of this approach is best exemplified by the case of State v.
Cress" in which the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that the
defendants' right to an unbiased jury requires some form of disclosure of
the fact of remarriage on voir dire. The court proceeded to adopt the
procedures embodied in the limited availibility model of voir dire.47 Cress is
particularly significant because the appellate court, after recognizing the

logic and force of the more liberal cautionary instruction model of
disclosure, felt constrained by its prior decisions to adopt the more
restricted limited availability model. 48 Examination of the earlier cases
which the court relied upon discloses that they dealt only with the
"4For example, introduction of evidence establishing the existence of liability insurance
in a personal injury action has been held to constitute grounds for reversal. See, e.g., Ellison v.
Wood & Bush Co., 153 W. Va. 506, 170 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Hope Windows Inc. v. Snyder, 208
Va. 489, 158 S.E.2d 722 (1968); J.C. Peiney Co. v. Barrientez, 411 P.2d 841 (Okla. 1966);
Bsichoff v. Koenig, 100 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1959); Finch v. Conley, 422 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1957).
See generally
McCoRMicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, (E.W. Cleary ed. 1972) § 201.
45
See, e.g., Rodak v. Fury, 31 App. Div. 2d 816, 817, 298 N.Y.S.2d 50, 53-54 (1969).
4622 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974).
47M. at 496-97, 528 P.2d at 882-83.
45

Ilinois and New Jersey havg approached the problems in a persuasive manner.
These courts have recognizdd two opposing objectives: prohibition of the juries'
consideration of the remarriage in arriving at damages and informing the jury that a
second marriage did exist, thereby obviating the need to refer to the plaintiff by a
prior name. These jurisdictions have accomplished the compromise by allowing the
judge, prior to voir dire examination of prospective jurors, to inform the prospective
panel that the plaintiff has remarried but that such fact cannot be used in arriving at
damages [citations omitted]. While we approve of both the logic and procedure
enveloped by this approach, we believe it transcends the statement of Hing and
accordingly abstain from approval.
22 Ariz. App. at 496-97, 528 P.2d at 882-83.
Further analysis of the court's opinion seems to reveal that this reasoning is self
contradictory. The court succinctly summarized the rule in Hing v. Youtsey, 10 Ariz. App.
540, 460 P.2d 646 (1969):
On balance we believe that Hing v. Youtsey, supra, is correct in prohibiting
evidence of remarriage as it relates to damages and abide by that decision.
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admissibility of remarriage on the issue of damages and did not address the
question of admissibility for other purposes. 49 Furthermore, the Arizona
Supreme Court has expressly declined to consider whether the fact of
remarriage can have relevance as a factor mitigating damages under the
Arizona Wrongful Death Statute.5 0 Thus, the court's decision that prior
cases compelled adoption of the restrictive approach appears misplaced. 51
Cress is defensible only by the broadest reading of prior Arizona
decisions. Nevertheless, the case may be significant as a harbinger of the
attitude which other courts will adopt when faced with a similar question.
That is, courts may conclude that prior decisions adopting the rule of
inadmissibility on the issue of damages are to be construed so as to prohibit
the admissibility of the fact of remarriage on voir dire. If this analysis is
correct it may be anticipated that the limited availibility model will gain
widespread acceptance as the only available alternative to the rule of
absolute exclusion. Implementation of this model would permit these
courts to balance the interests of the litigants while remaining faithful to
the "command" of prior decisions. Note, however, that at least one court
22 Ariz. App. at 496, 528 P.2d at 882 (emphasis added).
This conclusion is then cited by the court as compelling the decision that the fact of
remarriage cannot be disclosed to the jury on voir dire, and that the cautionary instruction
model, see text accompanying notes 53-56 infra, must be rejected. But this cannot be correct
since the court had previously noted:
Adherence to the rule prohibiting evidence of remarriage in relation to the issue of
damages does not dispose of appellants' contention that reference to a widow by the
surname of her prior marriage perpetrates a fraud upon the jury.
22 Ariz. App. at 496, 528 P.2d at 882. Thus, there are two separate and distinct inquiries and
the court apparently confused them. It appears that the reliance upon the "command" of
Hing is misplaced and adoption of the cautionary instruction model would not have been
contrary to the prior decisions of the Arizona courts.
49
See, e.g., Hing v. Youtsey, 10 Ariz. App. 540, 460 P.2d 646 (1969); City of Phoenix v.
Whiting, 10 Ariz. App. 189, 457 P.2d 729 (1969). In fact, the appellants in Brief for Appellant
at 56, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974), recognized the general rule against
admitting evidence of the remarriage of the surviving spouse, but contended that that rule was
"not absolute or unequivocal."
5
oSee State v. Stone, 104 Ariz. 339, 452 P.2d 513 (1969) supp. opinion 104 Ariz. 344, 452
P.2d 518 (1969), where the court stated:
The confusion seems to stem from the sentence "The fact of remarriage can only
have relevance as a factor mitigating damages under the 1956 statute." This was not
intended to imply that evidence of remarriage would be proper under the 1956
statute, but only to indicate that defendant claimed that under the 1956 statute the
fact of remarriage of a plaintiff, had some relevance. Since we held that the 1956
statute was inapplicable we did not deem it necessary to discuss the defendant's
position.
The 51Arizona wrongful death statute is found at ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-613 (1956).
See note 48 supra. In order to explain Cress, Hing must be construed to hold that
evidence of remarriage is inadmissible for any purpose. Little support for this view can be
found in the precise wording of the Hing opinion where the court adopted the statement of 87
A.L.R.2d 252, 255 to the effect that
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that has faced the question of the scope of prior decisions has adopted the
more defensible view that the general rule of inadmissibility on the issue of
damage mitigation does not require that the trial court bar mention of the
fact of remarriage as it relates to identification of the parties during voir

dire.5

2

The Cautionary Instruction Model
The cautionary instruction model of voir dire is based upon the
premise that the jury is capable of accepting information for a limited
purpose and that a properly framed cautionary instruction would protect
the plaintiff from prejudice resulting from the disclosure of the fact of
remarriage. Under this model either the trial judge or the defense counsel
will inform the jurors of the fact of remarriage, identify the new spouse,
and question the prospective jurors as to their acquaintance with the new
spouse or the plaintiff in her newly acquired name. The judge will then
explain the purpose of the disclosure and instruct the jurors that the
plaintiff's remarriage is not to be considered in determining liability or
assessing damages. Of course, cross examination as to the fact or circumstances of remarriage would be highly prejudicial and constitute reversible
53
error.
The cautionary instruction necessitated by this model would normally
be given sua sponte by the trial judge in his initial indentification of the
parties. Nevertheless, the judge might choose to allow the defense counsel
to disclose the fact on examination of the prospective jurors and then
[t]he majority of American jurisdictions which have considered the question hold
the remarriage of a surviving spouse, or the possibility thereof, does not affect the
damages recoverable for wrongful death of the deceased spouse.
10 Ariz. App. at 543, 460 P.2d at 649 (emphasis added). The court in Hing noted that this rule
had been followed in City of Phoenix v. Whiting, 10 Ariz. App. 189, 457 P.2d 729 (1969), and
stated: "We hearken to this precedent and conclude likewise that the issue of marriage was
properly excluded." 10 Ariz. App. at 543, 460 P.2d at 649 (footnote omitted).
52
See Mulvey v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356 (1972), afj'd, 53 Ill.
2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's procedure and the
defense counsel's contention that there was a right, on voir dire, to identify the parties by their
actual names. The statutory basis of this right was found in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234,
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110A, par. 234 (1969), which provides: "The judge shall initiate voir dire
examination of jurors by identifying the parties ..
"
53
See, e.g., Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973), where the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to extend the rule admitting evidence of remarriage on voir dire which
had been adopted in Mulvey v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356 (1972),
aff'd, 53 IIl. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973). The court stated:
[The] cross-examination... clearly exceeded the scope of the direct examination. Its
purpose was to and it did emphasize plaintiff's remarriage.... The questions and
resulting answers were clearly irrelevant under earlier decisions. ...
54 Ill. 2d at 503-G4, 301 N.E.2d at 306. See also note 43 supra.
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interrupt, or conclude, the voir dire with the appropriate instruction. Such
a "theatrical" approach might help to assure the impact of the instruction.
It can be anticipated that a good number of plaintiffs will choose to forego
their right to have the instruction repeated at the conclusion of the trial. 54
Under the cautionary instruction model the plaintiff may be addressed
throughout the trial by the name she acquired through remarriage
following the alleged wrongful death of her first husband. In this manner
the cautionary instruction model would eliminate the "perpetration of
fraud" upon the jury through court sanctioned misrepresentations which
critics assert are necessitated by the limited availability model. At the same
time, however, this more liberal procedure presents the jury with information which is unnecessary for their propr deliberations and which might
be employed, perhaps unconsciously, to the prejudice of the plaintiff. In
response, proponents of the cautionary instruction model can point to the
fact that courts, in other contexts, have recognized the desirability of
presenting certain facts to the jury with instructions that it would be
improper for them to consider these facts in their deliberations. 55 In

essence, the cautionary instruction model must still find its validity in the
basic presumption "that the jury, after proper instructions by the court,
will be capable of returning a verdict uninfluenced by the plaintiff's
56
remarriage."
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES

The two alternative models presented must be evaluated against the
54

The reasons for such a decision are evident. Counsel may determine that reiteration of
the cautionary instruction at the close of the trial would operate to compound the supposed
prejudicial effects of the initial disclosure and that silence at this point would best serve the
interests of his client. It must be remembered that the defendant will not be permitted to refer
to the fact of remarriage during the presentation of evidence or in his closing argument. Thus,
if plaintiff refrains from requesting an instruction at the close of the case the only reference to
the remarriage would have occurred during the initial phases of voir dire, an event which may
have occurred weeks or months prior to the jury's ultimate deliberations. It is at least
debatable whether such a time lapse would operate to the benefit of the plaintiff 6r the
defendant. In any event, such a discussion is merely academic if one accepts the premise that
the jury
will follow the instructions they are initially given.
55
See, e.g., Moore v. Atchison, Topeka 8c Santa Fe R. R., 28 111. App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d
393 (1960), where the court, in an action brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA), noted:
Plaintiff complains that he was prejudiced by controversy over treatment of the fact
that Adair's widow had remarried again to a man named Lary. At the outset of the
case the court ruled that evidence of the subsequent marriage of the widow would
not be competent, and instructed the jury that the fact that any beneficiary may have
married or remarried, "if such appears in evidence or has been suggested to you is
immaterial and should be disregarded by you in your deliberation."
Id. at 355, 171 N.E.2d at 400. See Seaboard Airline R. R. v. Conner, 261 F.2d 656 (4th Cir.
1958) (FELA action). See also Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 262, 245 A.2d 177, 180 (1969), citing
State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 178-79, 142 A.2d 65, 85 (1958).
56
Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 262, 245 A.2d 177, 180-81 (1969).
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generalized aims which any procedure must attempt to satisfy. These may
be summarized as (a) to allow for selection of an unbiased jury; (b) to avoid
misrepresentation and to preserve the integrity of the judicial process; and
(c) to protect the plaintiff from jury prejudice which might result from
disclosure of her remarriage.
Judged against these criteria it can be seen that the limited availability
model of voir dire examination fails to accomplish these goals. While this
model has advantages, when compared to a rule of exclusion, in that it
facilitates the selection of an unbiased jury, it falls short of total effort to
guarantee that result. The principal objection to the exclusionary rule is
that the plaintiff may only be known to a juror through her newly acquired
surname. Even though the new spouse may be introduced to the jury, the
fact of remarriage is not disclosed under the limited availability model. It
may be presumptuous to assume that a juror will be able to establish the
link between this person and the plaintiff. Thus, there is no guarantee that
a jury will be selected which is unfamiliar with the plaintiff or the
plaintiff's associates.
If the limited availability model has deficiencies when evaluated with
respect to the first criteria, one can only conclude that these deficiencies arv
compounded when the analysis focuses on the second criteria. As noted, the
plaintiff, having just concluded an oath to tell the "whole" truth,
misrepresents her name and thereby misrepresents her marital status by
responding to the first question posed with the surname of her prior
marriage, a name which she no longer employs. Such a procedure is
institutionalized by the limited availability model. Thus, the presentation
of an honest, factual picture to the jury is avoided and the misrepresentations are sanctioned by the court.
The limited availability model is defensible only on the basis of the
third criteria proposed. This, of course, is the rationale for the general
exclusionary rule. It is based on the premise that the jury will be unable to
restrict use of the knowledge of remarriage and will, instead, employ the
fact of remarriage to mitigate damages and, perhaps, deny liability. Even
granting the validity, or partial validity of this contention, it must be noted
that the determination of an appropriate procedure for voir dire must be
based on a balance of these considerations. In State v. Cress, discussed
above, the appellants, arguing against the extension of the exclusionary
rule to voir dire, sought to balance these considerations as follows:
[A]ppellants contend that honesty and realism and integrity in the judicial
process is more important than the fact of a possible prejudice that the
plaintiff may not receive the full measure of her rightful damages. It is
submitted that the exclusionary rule is anachronistic, being punitive in
nature and serves no realistic purpose in view of the falsehoods which
must be perpetrated in order to protect the exclusionary rule.5 7
57Brief for Appellant at 42, State v. Cress, 22 Ariz. App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974) [on file at

the
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Analyzed against these criteria the cautionary instruction model presents a more suitable alternative. Admittedly, this procedure presumes that
a jury is capable of returning a verdict uninfluenced by facts which they
have been expressly instructed to ignore. For example, this was the
presumption made by the trial court in Thompson v. Petersand eventually
rejected on appeal. 58 More important, however, is the fact that the
cautionary instruction model amply satisfies the first two suggested criteria
for a model procedure. First, by permitting the fact of remarriage to be
disclosed on voir dire, the procedure goes as far as possible to assure that no
juror has any association with, or bias with regard to, the plaintiff or her
associates. Furthermore, introduction of this fact allows the plaintiff to be
referred to by her present married name thereby avoiding misrepresentation
and assuring, to the extent possible, that the integrity of the judicial
process will be preserved. Finally, the cautionary instruction is designed to
impress upon the jury the limited purpose for which they are to employ
their knowledge of the plaintiff's present marital status. Thus, the
cautionary instruction model goes far to satisfy the goals of judicial
integrity without sacrificing the plaintiff's interest in a determination of
liability and damages free of prejudice imposed by informing the jury of
the remarriage of the plaintiff.
PROPOSED: A MODEL CAUTIONARY INSTRUCrION

The time at which the cautionary instruction is to be given has received
little attention. undoubtedly, this derives from the view that the instruction
must necessarily follow the disclosure of the fact of remarriage and
postponement to a later point in the trial, e.g. the close of the case, would
render the instruction too remote to induce proper jury obedience. A
delayed instruction would allow the jury to hear the evidence presented in
the case colored by its knowledge of the present marital status of the
plaintiff without any warning by the court that this fact is not to affect
their deliberations. Thus, the cautionary instruction is properly employed
at voir dire immediately following the disclosure of the fact of remarriage,
or by the judge in his opening remarks to the prospective jurors,
identifying the parties to the litigation. Moreover, if the plaintiff requests
that the instruction be incorporated in the charge to the jury at the
conclusion of the evidence, that request should be granted.
Examination of cases employing cautionary instructions, 5 9 particularly
5826 Mich. App. 590, 182 N.W.2d 763 (1970). Eventually the supreme court reversed the
decision of the appellate court on the grounds that the jury's behavior indicated that the

admission of evidence of remarriage, if error, was not grounds for reversal. See Thompson v.
Peters, 386 Mich. 532, 194 N.W.2d 301 (1972).
App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356 (1972),
5959 See, e.g., Mulvey v. Ill. Bell. Tel. Co., 5 Ill.
aff'd, 53 Il. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973); Thompson v. Peters, 26 Mich. App. 590, 182
N.W.2d 763 (1970), rev'd, 386 Mich. 532, 194 N.W.2d 301 (1972). Cf. cases cited at note 55
supra. See generally Remarriage and the Illinois Act, supra note 4.
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the decisions of the Illinois courts, suggests that the following four elements
must be incorporated in a model instruction:
(1) the instruction must properly inform the jury of the present
marital status of the plaintiff;
(2) the jury must be informed that the fact of remarriage is not a
material factor to be considered in its deliberations;
(3) the fact of remarriage should not affect the determination of
liability;
(4) the fact of remarriage should not be considered by the jury as a
factor diminishing or mitigating damages.
A model instruction incorporating these factors is best presented by
illustration. Suppose that Mr. Charles Smith was killed in a job related
accident on January 5, 1973. On April 5, 1974, the surviving spouse, Joan,
married Robert Jones and thereafter became known as Joan Jones. At the
commencement of the voir dire examination the following instruction
should be given to the prospective jurors:
[I am going to ask you] [Counsel for the defendant is planning to ask you]
if any of you know the* plaintiff Joan Smith. In order to answer this
question truthfully it is necessary for me to inform you that on April 5,
1974 Joan Smith married Robert Jones and thereafter became known as
Joan Jones. It is important that in answering this question you determine
whether you know the plaintiff and the fact that you know her as either
Mrs. Smith or Mrs. Jones is not important. [The Court] [Counsel] is
merely trying to determine if you have any personal familiarity with the
plaintiff and for this purpose, and for this purpose only, it is necessary to
inform you that she has remarried and assumed the name Joan Jones. At
the conclusion of this case, I will give you instructions concerning the law
to be applied. [You will be told that the fact that the plaintiff has
remarried is immaterial and that you are not to use such a fact in
determining either liability or damages.] The fact of remarriage should be
dismissed from your minds and should have no effect on your deliberations.
The following instruction should be given at the conclusion of the
evidence if requested by the plaintiff:
[The Court] [Counsel] has informed you that the widow of Mr. Charles
Smith remarried sometime between the death of her husband and the
commencement of this lawsuit. You are instructed not to consider this fact
in determining either liability or damages in this case. This cause of action
arose on January 5, 1973 and damages, if any, are to be determined as of
that date. The fact of remarriage is not to be used to increase, diminish, or
mitigate damages, if any, which the plaintiff might otherwise be entitled
to receive. You are instructed to determine the damages, if any, as of the
date this cause of action arose and any event subsequent to that date is not
60
to enter into your consideration.
60
The model instruction suggested is based in large part on the instruction employed by
the trial court in Thompson v. Peters, 26 Mich. App. 590, 182 N.W.2d 763 (1970), rev'd, 386

1976]

REMARRIAGE AND WRONGFUL DEATH

299

Such an instruction would go farther to satisfy the court's desire to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to protect it from fraud
and misrepresentation while protecting the plaintiff from improper diminution of the damage award.
CONCLUSION

Whether or not one accepts the validity of the general rule of exclusion
of the fact of remarriage it is clear that different considerations affect the
choice of procedure to be employed in the conduct of a proper voir dire
examination. The persuasive force of the exclusionary rule pales when
compared to the necessity of assuring the parties a fair and unbiased jury
and the relevant policy considerations which are embodied in the notion of
judicial integrity. In the context of voir dire examination the fact that the
plaintiff has remarried since the alleged wrongful death of her previous
spouse may have to be disclosed to the prospective jurors.
The determination of the proper procedure by which to disclose the
fact of remarriage is influenced by a number of somewhat abstract
considerations. Perhaps it is for this reason that alternative models have
developed. Nevertheless, the paramount considerations of any procedure
must be the preservation of the integrity of the judicial process and the
guarantee of an unbiased jury to the defendant. One must recall that it is
these considerations which have caused the courts initially to remove voir
dire from the scope of the general exclusionary rule. The cautionary
instruction model, embodying full disclosure of the fact of remarriage and
a cautionary instruction to assure its proper employment, appears best

structured to accomplish these ends.
The cautionary instruction model, however, runs contrary to the
presumption of past decisions that the.jurors, once informed of a fact, cannot
erase that fact from their memory in deciding subsequent issues. Therefore,
it would come as little surprise if the adoption of such an uniform procedure
is welcomed by the defense bar and scorned by plaintiff oriented practitioners.
It must also be recognized that the strongest argument against disclosure
Mich. 532, 194 N.W.2d 301 (1972). The instruction was disapproved by the appellate court

which held that in an action for wrongful death, the plaintiff, who has remarried, should have
identified throughout the entire trial by her name before remarriage.
A similar instruction was employed in Mulvey v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057,
284 N.E.2d 356 (1972), where the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Under our Supreme Court Rules, however, at this time I would like to instruct you
that it has been suggested that Mrs. Mulvey has remarried. You are instructed now
that remarriage, if such is the fact, is immaterial and is not to be considered by you.
Id. at 1060, 284 N.E.2d at 358. See the same case on appeal, 53 II. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689
(1973) (finding jury never reached the damage issue so could not be prejudiced by the

instruction).
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on voir dire is that the integrity and impartiality of the jury selection process
can be adquately protected by a thorough voir dire conducted within the
guidelines of present rules. Admittedly, it is difficul-t to construct a situation
where proper voir dire would not disclose the hidden bias of familiarity
which the cautionary instruction model is meant to prevent. Nevertheless,
courts and commentators have been moving away from the rigidity of ihe
collateral source rule. Decisions like Dubil, Wasel, and Watson indicate that
the courts perceive a problem with the present procedures. The cautionary
instruction model offers no more, and no less, than an alternative.
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